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ASSAULT WEAPON BANS: 
CAN THEY SURVIVE RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY? 
Clayton E. Cramer* 
In the last two decades, legislatures and courts have been 
increasingly willing to argue that a certain class of firearms termed 
“assault weapons” are not protected by the Second Amendment, and may 
be regulated or banned even though functionally identical firearms are not 
generally subject to such laws.  The United States Supreme Court has long 
recognized that distinctions in laws must be rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.1  Do assault weapons bans meet this standard, or 
are they a panic driven response to the fear of gang violence and random 
mass murder? 
I.  WHAT IS AN “ASSAULT WEAPON”? 
Starting in 1989, with the passage of California’s Roberti-Roos 
Assault Weapons Control Act (AWCA),2 a new term has entered the 
American legal vocabulary: “assault weapon” (AW).  What is it? 
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1. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute 
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).  
2. Carl Ingram, Assault Gun Ban Wins Final Vote: Deukmejian’s Promised Approval Would 
Make It 1st Such U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-05-
19/news/mn-112_1_assault-weapons-ban-military-style-assault-types-of-semiautomatic-rifles/2 (last 
accessed Feb. 27, 2016). 
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Generally, these are semiautomatic rifles and pistols that use 
detachable magazines.  AWs usually fire a less powerful cartridge 
than hunting rifles and have a somewhat military appearance (black 
plastic stocks, pistol grips, and bayonet lugs being common 
components).  AWs are functionally indistinguishable from sporting 
arms that have been used for more than a century by civilians in the 
U.S. with semiautomatic, detachable magazine feed. 
Most statutes have combined a make and model named list with a 
further prohibition against weapons “substantially identical”3 to those 
already the listed.  State by state, these lists tend to vary slightly.  New 
Jersey’s named list bans the “Demro TAC-1 carbine” while California’s 
similar statute4 does not mention it.  Many guns appear on both lists, with 
slight differences in name (FN-FAL, FN-LAR, or FN-FNC type 
semiautomatic firearms in New Jersey’s list;5 Fabrique Nationale FAL, 
LAR, FNC in California’s list).6  Comparing these lists of named weapons 
and functional characteristics raises some startling conclusions. 
That AW bans focused primarily on name and model numbers rather 
than functional characteristics should be a tipoff.  Whatever the public 
safety hazards these weapons present, those interested in banning them 
had a hard time finding common risk factors that could have enabled them 
to write a practical definition.  Most weapons were derived from fully 
automatic military weapons and bear a strong resemblance to their fully 
automatic ancestors.  (There are some exceptions, such as the Calico M-
950, for example, which has no military origin).  None of these weapons 
are readily convertible to fully automatic fire.  If they were readily 
convertible to fully automatic fire, then they would qualify as 
machineguns under federal law7 which would subject them to 
substantially stricter federal8 and state licensing laws.9 
3. N.J.S.A. § 2C:39-1(w)(2)(“Any firearm manufactured under any designation which is
substantially identical to any of the firearms listed above.”). 
4. Cal. Penal Code § 30510 (2014). 
5. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(w)(1).
6. Cal. Penal Code § 30510 (2014). 
7. 26 USC § 5845(b) (2014)(“The term ‘machinegun’ means any weapon which shoots, is
designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without 
manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.  The term shall also include the frame or receiver 
of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts 
designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of 
parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the 
control of a person.”).  See 27 C.F.R. § 179.11, ATF Rul. 82-3, 82-8, 83-5, and 81-4 for regulations 
redefining previously semiautomatic guns or parts into machineguns. 
8. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5872. 
9. Cal. Penal Code § 32650(a) (2014). 
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II. NAMED LISTS AS CARELESS BILLS OF ATTAINDER
American laws usually prohibit or regulate items not by name, but 
by functional characteristics.  For example, California defines the 
“destructive device” commonly known as a “Molotov Cocktail” by its 
functional characteristics: “Any breakable container that contains a 
flammable liquid with a flashpoint of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less and 
has a wick or similar device capable of being ignited, other than a device 
which is commercially manufactured primarily for the purpose of 
illumination.”10  This matches the dictionary definition of “a crude 
incendiary grenade consisting of a glass container filled with flammable 
liquid and a wick for ignition.”11 
The California Penal Code definition is legally superior to relying on 
a dictionary definition because a defendant could argue that he did not 
know what the phrase “Molotov cocktail” meant and was therefore 
ignorant that he was violating the law.  Also, minor non-functional 
changes (such as substituting an electrical ignitor instead of a wick) might 
create questions as to whether a named prohibition of a “Molotov 
cocktail” was insufficiently precise. 
While most AW bans have functional definitions of the banned 
weapons, named list definitions based on manufacturer’s name and model 
number are a common part of these laws.  These named lists are similar 
to “bills of attainder,” legislative acts that punish persons by name for 
alleged crimes instead of specifying a crime or allowing due process by 
the courts to determine guilt.  For example, a law banning the sale of a 
named product made by Colt Industries or its AR-15, with no similar ban 
on sales by another manufacturer would effectively deny Colt the equal 
protection of law.  To make these distinctions in an arbitrary manner is 
contrary to existing case law.12 
Not only does the named list approach lead to equal protection 
problems, but it makes it very easy to subvert these laws.  As an example 
of the defective nature of named lists, California’s Assault Weapons 
Control Act banned the Intratec TEC-9 by name.  The manufacturer 
responded by making minor non-functional changes to the gun and giving 
10. Cal. Penal Code § 16460(5) (2016). 
11. ACADEMIC PRESS DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1404 (Christopher G.
Morris eds. 1992). 
12. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (“The Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike.”). 
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it a new model number: DC913 (presumably “Designed for California”).  
The TEC-9 and TEC-DC9 are otherwise identical.14  When the 1994 
federal ban took effect listing the TEC-9, the manufacturer created “an 
AB-10 (‘after ban’) model that does not have a threaded barrel or a barrel 
shroud but is identical to the TEC-9 in other respects, including the ability 
to accept an ammunition magazine outside the pistol grip.”15  While the 
federal AW ban prohibited new manufacture of 32 round magazines, ones 
made before the new law still work in the AB-10 gun.16 
The U.S. Constitution Article I, section 10 prohibits states from 
passing bills of attainder and limits the legislative branches of state 
government.17  In the past, clever state governments have worked around 
this by executive orders, such as Missouri Governor Boggs’s 1838 order 
to the militia that Mormons be driven from the state or killed.18  As a 
recent work on constitutional law described the problem of bills of 
attainder: 
[T]he paradigmatic example of legislation whose violation of equality 
and due process contravenes the rule of law.  It denies the separation of 
powers between legislature and judiciary, and the related distinction be-
tween legislative and judicial process, and so removes the protection that 
law is meant to provide from governmental hostility and arbitrary 
power.19 
In the 1990s, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
struck down a list of named “assault weapon” bans for vagueness.20  Even 
13. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In Re 101 California Street: A Legal and
Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of “Assault Weapons,” 8 Stan. 
Law & Policy Rev. 41, 46-47 (1997). 
14. Christopher S. Koper, An Updated Assessment of the Federal Assault Weapons Ban:
Impacts on Gun Markets and Gun Violence, 1994-2003, at 10 (June 2004) at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204431.pdf (last accessed July 25, 2016).  This report was 
funded by the Department of Justice in response to a request by Congress. 
15. Id.
16. Id. 
17. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder.”).
18. MORMONISM: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 330 (W. Paul Reeve & Ardis E. Parshall
eds., 2010). 
19. T.R.S. Allen, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW 148 
(2001). 
20. Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 29 F.3d 250, 251 (6th Cir. 1994) (striking
down a city ordinance for vagueness and not reaching bill of attainder question because of vagueness). 
The ordinance defines “assault weapon” as any one of thirty-four specific rifles, three spe-
cific shotguns and nine specific pistols, or “[o]ther models by the same manufacturer with 
the same action design that have slight modifications or enhancements. . . .” The weapons 
are specified by brand name and model, not generically or by defined categories. Plaintiffs 
challenge the ordinance as an unconstitutional bill of attainder because it constrains only 
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when the ordinance was amended to prohibit “assault weapons” based on 
functional characteristics, the Sixth Circuit held that such definitions were 
vague, because they may require more knowledge than a person of 
“average intelligence [possesses] to determine whether a particular 
firearm is included within its prohibition.”21 
III. WHAT MAKES “ASSAULT WEAPONS” SO DANGEROUS?
The California Department of Justice examined the issue of AWs and 
public safety both before and after passage of the AWCA in 1989.  These 
reports were not part of the legislative process.  They demonstrate that 
there was no rational basis for the law.  Steve Helsley, Acting Assistant 
Director of the Investigation and Enforcement Branch, wrote a memo on 
October 31, 1988, a year before the bill passed, asking “whether a 
definition could be formulated which would allow legislative control of 
‘assault rifles’ without infringing on sporting weapons.”22  He concluded, 
“I do not think that the necessary precision in possible.”23 Helsley also 
pointed out that, 
Obviously, there have been some high visibility crimes which involved 
semi-automatics UZI’s and AK-47’s, but I suspect a close analysis 
would put that frequency at or slightly above the statistical aberration 
level.  Last year, I surveyed the firearms used in violent crimes which 
were submitted to BFS [Bureau of Forensic Services] analysis. . . . I be-
lieved that this would provide a good picture of what criminals use when 
they want to hurt someone.  The figures are self-explanatory and con-
firmed our intuition that assault type firearms were the least of our wor-
ries.  It’s really the .22 and .38 Caliber handguns and 12 gauge shotguns 
that inflict the majority of the carnage. 
Consequently, I believe that assault weapons cannot be defined in a 
workable way, by size, caliber, action type or magazine capacity. . . .  
the named manufacturers while other manufacturers are free to make and sell similar prod-
ucts. Plaintiffs also contend that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. 
Id. 
21. Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus, 152 F. 3d 522, 536 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“Therefore, anyone who possesses a semiautomatic center fire rifle or carbine that accepts a 
detachable magazine is subject to prosecution so long as a magazine exists with a capacity of twenty 
rounds or more. Since the ordinance contains no scienter requirement, an owner’s complete lack of 
knowledge as to the magazine’s existence is of no consequence.”). 
22. Memorandum to G.W. Clemons, Dir. Div. Law Enforcement from S.C. Helsley, Acting
Asst. Dir., on Assault Rifles, Oct. 31, 1988, 1.  Because this document required a Public Records 
Access request, you can read it at http://www.claytoncramer.com/primary/other/Helsley88AWCa.pdf 
(last accessed July 25, 2016). 
23. Id.
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Unless a realistic definition can be developed for “assault weapons,” we 
should leave the issue alone.24 
After passage of the law in 1989, the California Criminalistics 
Institute (a unit of the California Department of Justice),25 studied the use 
of “assault weapons” in 1990 based on information from crime labs 
throughout the state.  It concluded: 
It is clear from this data that assault weapons play a very small role in 
assault and homicide cases submitted to city and county labs.  This data 
shows that in the neighborhood of less than 5% of homicide and assault 
weapons fall into the § 12276 PC list.  This is in agreement with previous 
data collected on firearms submitted to CA DOJ labs prior to the enact-
ment of the AWCA as well as for the year following the effective date 
of that law.26 
The report explains that they counted “4844 guns which included 45 
‘assault weapons;’” thus, less than one percent of guns were assault 
weapons.  As the report further explained, the Los Angeles Sheriff’s 
Office (LASO) destroyed 3881 guns, preventing their identification.  “If 
the LASO data is ignored, the total number of guns is 963 which includes 
36 ‘assault weapons’ (~3.7%) which is probably a more accurate 
reflection of numbers of ‘assault weapons’ actual[ly] encountered in 
homicides and assaults.”  Even with this significant loss of data, the report 
explained why relying on crime labs for determining frequency of 
criminal use of assault weapons likely overstated their presence: 
First, if all guns are not being examined by forensic laboratories, many 
of those not seen will be the usual pistols and revolvers which make up 
the bulk of guns used in violent crimes thus maintaining the proportions. 
It is likely that, if there is a skewing of the data, that it is to accentuate 
the apparent use of “assault weapons.”  This because these weapons are 
infrequently seen by law enforcement so they are unfamiliar with them 
as a group and there is frequently a question of whether the firearm is or 
has been converted to full automatic fire (machine gun).  This results in 
an increased likelihood that a recovered ‘assault weapon’ will be exam-
ined by a forensic specialist.27 
The report also acknowledges that there were difficulties 
determining whether a particular firearm was actually a weapon regulated 
24. Id. at 3. 
25. California Criminalistics Institute, https://oag.ca.gov/cci (last accessed Apr. 5, 2016). 
26. Torrey D. Johnson, Report on a Survey of the Use of “Assault Weapons” in California in
1990, 1, available at http://www.claytoncramer.com/primary/other/Johnson91AWCa.pdf. 
27. Id. at 2. 
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by the AWCA, and they used the “most generous interpretation. . . . This 
will give the worst case results.”28  The report concludes: “The incidence 
of the use of ‘assault weapons’ is very much lower than the media and law 
makers seem to represent.”29 
With so much agreement within the California Department of Justice 
that assault weapons constituted only a tiny fraction of criminal misuses, 
why did California Attorney General John Van de Kamp assert the 
importance of passing the AWCA?  His speech to California police chiefs 
suggests that he saw this as a wedge issue for breaking open the gates to 
more restrictive gun control laws: 
“It can win, but the margin of victory will be narrow at best,” he said. 
Past defeats have resulted from debate deteriorating “into a pitched bat-
tle between those who would ban all guns and those who would regulate 
none of them,” he said. 
This time, Van de Kamp said, the debate should be limited to law en-
forcement issues.  He said there are many members of the NRA, among 
them police officers, who do not agree with the association’s consistent 
opposition to all forms of gun control.30 
Other evidence suggests the AWCA was based not on public safety 
but political expedience: “Sponsors of the AWCA, including Senator 
Roberti, Assemblyman Roos, Attorney General Van de Kamp, and law 
enforcement administrators, held a strategy session at which they decided 
that ‘certain weapons probably had too large a constituency to ever be 
worth the risk of including, Ruger Mini 14, M1 Carbine, M1 Garand, 
etc.’”31 and that “[i]nformation on assault weapons would not be sought 
from forensic laboratories as it was unlikely to support the theses [that 
assault weapons were the preferred choice of drug-trafficking 
organizations and violent criminals] on which the legislation would be 
based.”32  Helsley also explained the random named list this way: 
[T]he list had become an odd collection of firearms which range from 
28. Id. at 3. 
29. Id. at 7. 
30. Steve Emmons, Van de Kamp Asks Police Chiefs for Support in Outlawing Assault Rifles, 
L.A.Times, Feb. 9, 1989. 
31. Memorandum to Patrick Kenady, Asst. Attorney General from S.C. Helsley, Asst. Dir.,
Enforcement Branch on Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 (c. Feb. 1991), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20081201093921/http://www.hoboes.com/pub/Politics/United%20State
s/Trust%20the%20Government/Insight%20into%20Anti-Legislation (last accessed July 25, 2016). 
32. Bruce H. Kobayashi and Joseph E. Olson, In Re 101 California Street: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the Manufacture and Sale of “Assault Weapons,” 8 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 44 (1997) [bracketed material in original]. 
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the long out of production, to exorbitantly expensive, to the “evil” AK 
47. As no specifically defined problem drove our efforts, such an odd
collection should not be surprising. . . . Most if not all of the principal 
players in crafting the legislation had absolutely no knowledge of fire-
arms.  Most of the weapons on the list are low production or long out of 
production items that constitute absolutely no conceivable threat.33 
In some cases, non-firearms have been added to the list: the Knight’s 
Armament RAS was on the list in 200034 even though the RAS is only a 
rail adapter system for attaching sights, flashlights, and the like.35 
The clear intent was to go after a small minority of guns and their 
owners, a group unlikely to have the political power to defend their 
interests.  Excluding contrary data demonstrates a lack of rational basis 
and intellectual honesty. 
Van de Kamp was widely considered an unannounced candidate for 
governor at the time36 and likely was using his support for this law as an 
opportunity to increase his public profile.  While seeking higher public 
office is not intrinsically problematic, it is not an adequate justification to 
avoid rational basis.  The percentages of AWs criminally used were so 
low that a ban on handguns or knives would have had a far stronger effect 
in reducing murders, but this would have been a bridge too far in the 
California of 1989.  Failure to pass it would have done nothing to raise 
Van de Kamp’s visibility for higher office. 
Other studies also demonstrate that AW bans were politicians’ 
irrational responses to public safety concerns.  In 1994, the federal 
government passed an assault weapon ban similar to those passed by 
many of the states in years before and after 1994, based on named lists 
and functional specifications.37  The federal ban also prohibited new 
manufacture for civilian use of Large Capacity Magazines (LCMs) (those 
holding more than 10 rounds).38  This law was passed with a sunset clause, 
causing its automatic repeal in 2004.39 
33. Helsley Memo, supra note 33. 
34. California Dept. of Justice, Kasler v. Lockyer Assault Weapon List,
http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/firearms/infobuls/kaslist.pdf (last accessed Apr. 13, 
2016). 
35. Knight’s Armament, Rail Adapter Systems, https://www.knightarmco.com/portfolio/m4-
carbine-ras (last accessed Apr. 13, 2016). 
36. Ken Hoover, California Attorney General Urges Assault Rifle Ban, UPI (Feb. 13, 1989),
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/02/13/California-attorney-general-urges-assault-rifle-
ban/5742603349200.  
37. Koper, supra note 15, at 4-6 (discussing Title XI, Subtitle A of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).  
38. Id. at 6. 
39. Id. at 4. 
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One part of the federal law directed the U.S. Attorney General to “to 
study the ban’s impact and report the results to Congress within 30 months 
of the ban’s enactment.”40  The first report on the effectiveness of the 
federal law found very little measureable result.  The authors (Roth and 
Koper) admitted on the very first page that they had a hard time 
“discerning the effects of the ban” at least partly because “the banned 
weapons and magazines were rarely used to commit murders in this 
country” before the 1994 ban.41 
Roth and Koper tried to figure out if the ban reduced the number of 
victims per mass murder.42 If the public safety hazard associated with 
AWs was because of high capacity magazines with the ability to spray 
bullets everywhere, you would expect to see mass murders decline. 
So what did the report find? They found a 6.7% reduction in murder 
rates in the fifteen states where the federal ban could have made a 
difference.  But this reduction was not statistically significant.  Because 
assault weapons had been used in a tiny percentage of murders before the 
ban, “it is highly improbable that the assault weapons ban produced an 
effect this large.”43  “The ban did not produce declines in the average 
number of victims per incident of gun murder or of gun murder victims 
with multiple wounds.”44 
What about “protecting police officers?”  This was a reason offered 
repeatedly for the ban.  There was a decline in assault weapons used to 
murder police officers, but Roth and Koper also admitted that “such 
incidents are sufficiently rare” that the data did not permit a reliable 
assessment of whether or not the law reduced gun murders of police 
officers.45 
Koper’s 2004 final report on the effect of the federal ban on crime 
rates observes that the ban was so narrowly written as to be easily 
subverted.  “Relatively cosmetic changes, such as removing a flash hider 
or bayonet mount, are sufficient to transform a banned weapon into a legal 
substitute, and a number of manufacturers now produce modified, legal 
versions of some of the banned guns.”46  One recent reminder was the 
2015 San Bernardino terrorist attack in which the shooter purchased one 
40. Id. at 20. 
41. Jeffrey A. Roth and Christopher S. Koper, Impacts of the 1994 Assault Weapons Ban:
1994-96, 1NCJ 173405 (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/173405.pdf  (last accessed July 25, 2016). 
42. Id. at 7. 
43. Id. at 8-9. 
44. Id. at 9. 
45. Id. 
46. Koper, supra note 15, at 10. 
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of these slightly altered guns, and modified it to be functionally equivalent 
to a banned AW.47  Emphasizing the cosmetic nature of both the named 
list and functional irrelevance of the specification lists, Koper observes: 
The gun ban provision targets a relatively small number of weapons 
based on outward features or accessories that have little to do with the 
weapons’ operation.  Removing some or all of these features is sufficient 
to make the weapons legal. In other respects (e.g, type of firing mecha-
nism, ammunition fired, and the ability to accept a detachable maga-
zine), AWs do not differ from other legal semiautomatic weapons.48 
If these bans were so easily subverted in ways that did not involve 
any significant functional change to the firearms available for sale, can 
such laws qualify as rationally based? 
Along with how easily these laws were subverted, Koper 
summarized other studies showing that the banned guns were used in a 
tiny percentage of crimes.  While the definition of AWs varied across 
different studies: 
[a]ccording to these accounts, AWs typically accounted for up to 8% of 
guns used in crime, depending on the specific AW definition and data 
source used . . . . A compilation of 38 sources indicated that AWs ac-
counted for 2% of crime guns on average.  Similarly, the most common 
AWs prohibited by the 1994 federal ban accounted for between 1% and 
6% of guns used in crime according to most of several national and local 
data sources examined for this and our prior study.49 
By comparison, “knives and other cutting instruments” in 2014 
caused 13.1% of U.S. murders.50 Yet knives can be purchased over the 
Internet or mail order with no questions asked, even when the search 
phrase is “combat knives military” (roughly analogous to “assault 
weapons”) which returns 1,625 results on Amazon.com with prices 
starting at $3.51 
Unlike AWs, knives are silent, and can be used without neighbors 
calling 911 to report gunshots.  Even publications long supportive of AW 
bans have sometimes admitted that there was no rational basis for such 
laws: 
47. Josh Richman, San Bernardino Shooting Stirs Gun Debate, San Jose Mercury-News, Dec. 
4, 2015 (last accessed Mar. 17, 2016). 
48. Koper, supra note 15, at 11. 
49. Id. at 15. 
50. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, Table 7, https://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-7. 
51. Author’s search, www.amazon.com, Mar.14, 2016. 
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But in the 10 years since the previous ban lapsed, even gun control ad-
vocates acknowledge a larger truth: The law that barred the sale of as-
sault weapons from 1994 to 2004 made little difference. 
It turns out that big, scary military rifles don’t kill the vast majority of 
the 11,000 Americans murdered with guns each year. Little handguns 
do. 
In 2012, only 322 people were murdered with any kind of rifle, F.B.I. 
data shows. 
The continuing focus on assault weapons stems from the media’s obses-
sive focus on mass shootings, which disproportionately involve weap-
ons like the AR-15, a civilian version of the military M16 rifle. This, in 
turn, obscures some grim truths about who is really dying from gun-
shots. 
One reason: The use of these weapons may be rare over all, but they’re 
used frequently in the gun violence that gets the most media coverage, 
mass shootings. 
The criminologist James Alan Fox at Northeastern University estimates 
that there have been an average of 100 victims killed each year in mass 
shootings over the past three decades. That’s less than 1 percent of gun 
homicide victims.52 
“We spent a whole bunch of time and a whole bunch of political capital 
yelling and screaming about assault weapons,” Mayor Mitchell J. Land-
rieu of New Orleans said.  He called it a “zero sum political fight about 
a symbolic weapon.”53 
So, if the guns prohibited were a tiny fraction of criminally misused 
guns, and a tiny fraction of far more commonly used and available murder 
weapons, why was so much political capital spent on these laws?  As 
Koper’s study observes, their use in the highly publicized but rare mass 
murders gave them a high profile: 
Early studies of AWs, though sometimes based on limited and poten-
tially unrepresentative data, also suggested that AWs recovered by po-
lice were often associated with drug trafficking and organized crime, 
fueling a perception that AWs were guns of choice among drug dealers 
52. Lois Beckett, The Assault Weapon Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 14, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/sunday-review/the-assault-weapon-myth.html?_r=0  (last 
accessed Mar. 14, 2016). 
53. Id. 
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and other particularly violent groups.54 
As Koper points out: “Looking at the nation’s gun crime problem 
more broadly, however, AWs and LCMs were used in only a minority of 
gun crimes prior to the 1994 federal ban, and AWs were used in a 
particularly small percentage of gun crimes.55  It hardly needs saying that 
perception is not reality, although reality is certainly a requirement for an 
action being reasonable. 
Underlying all of the “assault weapon” statues and ordinances is the 
explicitly stated belief that they are a public safety hazard.  California’s 
Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act justified its need this way: 
“The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the proliferation and use 
of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all 
citizens of this state.”56  While the statement might well be true, the same 
could be said for handguns, knives, and automobiles, all of which caused 
more deaths than the rarely criminally misused named AWs as we 
discussed above.  In light of the apparent suppression of contrary data on 
criminal misuse, it cannot be said that this legislative statement is rational. 
So, AW bans seem to be a strong reaction to a category of weapons 
that are used far less often for murder than the relatively lightly regulated 
category of knives.  The statutes also seem to be easily subverted by 
functionally irrelevant changes to firearms. 
IV. SENTENCE LENGTH AS AN INDICATOR OF IRRATIONALITY
Looking at the minimum sentences provided for AW violations 
relative to other crimes gives a pretty clear picture of what the legislatures 
considered the level of public safety hazard associated with AWs. 
California’s minimum sentence for possession of an unlicensed machine 
gun57 is substantially shorter than the minimum sentence for sale or 
importation of an “assault weapon.”58  Even more curiously, possession 
of a hand grenade is even a lighter sentence than either.59  (This is a 
54. Koper, supra note 15, at 14 (emphasis added). 
55. Id. 
56. Cal. Penal Code § 12275.5(a) (1990). 
57. Cal. Penal Code § 32625(a) and 1170 (h)(1)(“a felony punishable pursuant to this
subdivision where the term is not specified in the underlying offense shall be punishable by a term of 
imprisonment in a county jail for 16 months, or two or three years.”). 
58. Cal. Penal Code § 30600 (2014) (“[U]pon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment
pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for four, six, or eight years.”). 
59. Cal. Penal Code § 12301(a)(2) (defines grenade as “destructive device”) and 12301(b)
(2014) (“shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a term not to exceed one year, or in 
state prison, or by a fine not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or by both such fine and 
imprisonment.”). 
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prohibition on functional hand grenades; possession or importation of a 
“metal military practice handgrenade or metal replica handgrenade” is 
prohibited elsewhere.60)  Adding to this strange disparity, the minimum 
sentence for forcible rape61 is less than the minimum sentence for import 
or transfer of an “assault weapon.”  Clearly, the California legislature 
considers “assault weapons” a greater public safety hazard than machine 
guns, grenades, or rapists, if the severity of the sentence is any indicator. 
This suggests a panic reaction, not a rational decision. 
V. RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY 
Can AW laws survive “rational basis” scrutiny?  What is the 
legitimate state interest rationally related to AW bans?  They affect 
weapons that are a small minority of criminally misused guns, and which 
are already subject to substantial federal and state regulations because 
they are firearms.  Weapons that are more commonly used for murder are 
available for mail order purchase with no similar level of restrictions. 
What is the “rational basis” test?  In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “The general rule is that 
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”62  In Cleburne, preventing mentally disabled people from living 
a residential neighborhood was not a legitimate state interest. 
Many of the existing Equal Protection Clause cases have involved 
not criminal prosecutions, but administrative actions for which, while 
there might be genuine concerns about inequality in results, no one would 
be going to prison.  In Plyer v. Doe (1977), the Court struck down a law 
that denied public school education to illegal alien children, upholding a 
district court opinion that the discrimination lacked “rational basis.”63  In 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (1985), the city of Cleburne denied a 
special use permit for a group home for the mentally disabled in a 
residential neighborhood.64  In FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. 
(1993) the Court upheld a regulatory distinction for a cable TV company 
60. Cal. Penal Code § 12020(a)(1)(2014) (“Any person in this state who does any of the
following is punishable by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year or in the state 
prison: . . . Manufactures or causes to be manufactured, imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers 
or exposes for sale, or who gives, lends, or possesses any metal military practice handgrenade or metal 
replica handgrenade. . . . “). 
61. Cal. Penal Code § 264(a)(2014) (“ [R]ape, as defined in Section 261 or 262, is punishable 
by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years.”). 
62. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 436, 437 (1985). 
63. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 208 (1977). 
64. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37. 
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where “transmission lines interconnect separately owned and managed 
buildings or if its lines use or cross any public right-of-way.”65 
Worse, the minimum sentences associated with some of these AW 
bans (such as California’s) are far more severe than those for possession 
of machine guns and hand grenades, both of which would seem at least as 
severe a public safety hazard as AWs.  That violation of the AW bans is 
more serious than forcible rape also shows a certain disproportionate 
reaction by the legislature. 
The AW bans impose prison sentences on violators—far more 
serious a consequence than the largely economic injuries struck down in 
many of the previously mentioned cases.  But there are Supreme Court 
decisions where there was no “reasonable” connection between the statute 
and legitimate governmental end66 and where jail time was the penalty.67  
By comparison, the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. 
Heller (2008) explicitly rejects “rational basis” as the standard of scrutiny 
concerning “the right to keep and bear arms” pointing to United States v. 
Carolene Products (1938) famous footnote four.68 
In Romer v. Evans (1996) the Court overruled an amendment to the 
Colorado State Constitution because: 
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and 
undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and, 
as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation.  Second, its sheer breadth 
is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment 
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it 
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.69 
Similarly, 
A second and related point is that laws of the kind now before us raise 
65. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 311 (1993). 
66. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,  399-400 (1923) (“The established doctrine is that this
liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public interest, by legislative 
action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of 
the State to effect.”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 536 (1925) (“Plaintiffs asked protection 
against arbitrary, unreasonable and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent 
destruction of their business and property.”) (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at 397 (“Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not less than twenty-five 
dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred dollars ($100) or be confined in the county jail for any 
period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.”). 
68. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (“If all that was required to overcome the
right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with 
the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”). 
69. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
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the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of ani-
mosity toward the class of persons affected. “[I]f the constitutional con-
ception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the 
very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”70 
The AW bans impose a “broad and undifferentiated disability on a 
single named group,” a category of firearms that have very little in 
common except for a somewhat menacing appearance, as well as creating 
a risk of arrest and prison for their owners.  (Those who register them are 
losing privacy rights even if the AWs remain in their owner’s home.) 
Like homosexuals (the protected group in Romer), gun owners and 
sometimes AW owners have been subject to ferocious, often religiously-
based criticism, comparing them to sexual deviants.  For example, the 
Coalition to Stop Gun Violence (CSGV) tweeted about the gun industry: 
“You’d be hard-pressed to imagine a more degenerate, immoral 
industry.”71  In another example, a poster from CSGV showing Satan has 
the headline, “If the devil did exist, he’d certainly fetishize weapons 
designed to take human life.”  In response to the CSGV question, “What’s 
the first word that comes to your mind when you hear ‘Gun Culture’?,”72 
comments again included sexual perversion and bigoted attacks like 
“Probably ammosexual.  But the vision that comes to mind is more 
powerful–a bunch of fat, unkempt, white guys walking around with guns 
in their belts and dangling off their shoulders, in public places attempting 
to intimidate others, but claiming they aren’t,” and “Insecure, bullying 
rednecks.”73  These comments by gun control organizations and activists 
are probably not typical of Americans, in the same way that the Westboro 
Baptist Church of “God Hates Fags!” is hardly typical of the support for 
Colorado’s Amendment 2 at the heart of the Romer decision; but they 
show the potential for the same irrational bigotry. 
Another problem with AW bans is that owners of assault weapons 
are rejected as legitimate citizens.  After New York passed the SAFE Act 
in 2013, Governor Cuomo made it very clear that people who disagreed 
with the SAFE Act should leave the state, albeit on less severe conditions 
than Governor Boggs’ order to the Mormons in 1838. 
70. Id. at 634. 
71. GUN FREE ZONE, CSGV BBQ Guns 1, http://gunfreezone.net/index.php/2015/11/20/csgv-
discovers-bbq-guns-bigotry-and-stupidity-ensues/csgv-bbq-guns-1 (last accessed July 25, 2016). 
72. GUN FREE ZONE, CSGV Gun Culture 2, 
http://gunfreezone.net/index.php/2015/07/15/csgv-hitting-every-branch-of-the-bigot-tree-on-their-
way-down/csgv-gun-culture-2 (last accessed Mar. 17, 2016). 
73. Id. 
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Are they these extreme conservatives who are right-to-life, pro-assault-
weapon, anti-gay? Is that who they are? Because if that’s who they are 
and they’re the extreme conservatives, they have no place in the state of 
New York, because that’s not who New Yorkers are.74 
 Cuomo essentially told AW owners that they were outside the 
legitimate membership of the polity of New York, almost like they were 
illegal aliens (the parallel to Plyer).  While journalists and gun control 
advocates might properly be considered outside the mainstream, the 
elected governor of New York is not. 
Court decisions have also demonstrated an irrational basis for such 
laws.  Upholding an Illinois city AW ban, Judge Easterbrook wrote: 
If it has no other effect, Highland Park’s ordinance may increase the 
public’s sense of safety. Mass shootings are rare, but they are highly 
salient, and people tend to overestimate the likelihood of salient 
events. . . . If a ban on semiautomatic guns and large-capacity magazines 
reduces the perceived risk from a mass shooting, and makes the public 
feel safer as a result, that’s a substantial benefit.75 
The same reasoning could have been applied to uphold the 
constitutional provision struck down in Romer. “Colorado voters may be 
irrational in their bigotry against homosexuals, but if it reduces their 
perceived risk of homosexuals being given free rein to molest children, 
that’s a substantial benefit.”  Clearly, when the courts argue that feeling 
safer is a legitimate reason to do something that makes no real difference 
in public safety, this is the definition of irrational.  It makes people feel 
better, but without any actual basis in fact. 
VI. AW BANS FAIL RATIONAL BASIS ANALYSIS
The evidence is clear that AW bans fail rational basis scrutiny 
because AWs are seldom criminally misused relative to more readily 
accessible weapons.  The disproportionate minimum sentences in 
California’s AWCA law relative to much more dangerous weapons 
suggests a panic reaction that is hardly rational.  The comments of 
journalists, elected officials, and gun control activists reveal bigotry that 
makes Colorado Amendment 2 seem pretty calm by comparison.  Even 
the courts are reduced to arguing that perceived benefit as opposed to 
74. Jesse McKinley, Comment by Cuomo Outrages Republicans, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/nyregion/cuomo-comment-elicits-retort-from-
republicans.html?_r=0  (last accessed Mar.16, 2016).  
75. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F. 3d 406, 412 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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actual benefit is a sufficient reason to uphold bans.  There is no way to 
hold that AW bans which deny a fundamental right, as Heller determined 
the Second Amendment to protect, survives the “rational basis” standard 
of scrutiny. 
